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We analyse strategic experimentation in which information arrives through fully re-
vealing, publicly observable “breakdowns.” With hidden actions, there exists a unique
equilibrium that involves randomization over stopping times. This randomization in-
duces belief disagreement on the equilibrium path. When actions are observable, the
equilibrium is pure, and welfare improves. We analyse the role of policy interven-
tions such as subsidies for experimentation and risk-sharing agreements. We show that
the optimal risk-sharing agreement restores the first-best outcome, independent of the
monitoring structure.
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1 Introduction
We do not learn from observing others in the same way that we learn from our own ex-
periences. There are at least two reasons for this difference. First, experimentation differs
from classical conditioning: unlike Pavlov’s dogs, we choose our actions to enable learn-
ing, whereas observational learning is largely passive. Second, our information concerning
others is typically imperfect: often, we observe how well they do rather than what they
do. This paper explains why these differences must lead to differences in beliefs, including
higher-order beliefs, even provided perfectly aligned fundamentals and outcomes that are
common knowledge. Belief disagreement leads to dispersion in actions, and the resulting
lack of coordination has significant welfare consequences.
Both our premise and our conclusion are relevant: economic practices are often largely
confidential (whether they pertain to sales or to distribution methods, consumer profiles,
advertising strategies, lists of suppliers and clients, or manufacturing processes), especially
when they involve projects rather than products; economic outcomes are instead easier
to ascertain. Indeed, to the extent that they have been documented, there is substantial
dispersion in such practices and the resulting performance across firms and industries.1
To explain how dispersion arises, we rely on a well-known strategic experimentation
model. Players choose whether to experiment in the face of purely aggregate uncertainty.
Formally, they continuously choose how much weight to assign to a risky action. Externalities
are informational. Players observe only one another’s outcomes, not their actions. We assume
binary individual outcomes (a “breakdown” or not) and a common binary state of the world
(good or bad). Occasional, publicly observable breakdowns occur when a player puts weight
on the risky action and when the state is bad. Hence, whereas a breakdown reveals the state
of the world to all players, the absence thereof causes objective and strategic uncertainty:
inferences regarding the state interact with inferences regarding the actions of others. In the
continuing absence of any breakdown, players grow increasingly optimistic about the state
over time. As a result, they are tempted to delay their use of the risky arm to free-ride on
the experimentation of others.
The game admits a unique symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. In particular, no
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.2 In light of the literature, this is surprising because
1A long history of empirical literature has documented heterogeneity in the adoption rates for new tech-
nologies: Mansfield (1961) observes patterns of “slow imitation” for a small number of innovations; Coleman,
Katz, and Menzel (1966) show distinct differences across physicians in the adoption of new medical technol-
ogy; and more recent studies (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, Syverson, 2011) document the wide dispersion
in managerial practices within an industry and relate it to persistent productivity differences.
2We show that with two players, no asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium exists either.
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we do not assume discrete action sets: by definition, giving (say) equal weight to both the
risky action and its safe alternative is a pure action in our framework. Because time is also
continuous, mixing is caused not by discreteness but by the intrinsic nature of incentives.
This relationship stands in contrast to the experimentation literature, discussed below, in
which a “mixed strategy” is merely an interpretation of actions that are interior (i.e., players
assign positive weight to both arms) as opposed to extremal.
In equilibrium, mixing involves each player choosing at random a time before which he
exclusively plays safe and after which he only plays risky. The distribution of switching
times is continuously increasing over an interval, with an atom at the upper end. Despite
being indifferent over an entire interval of such random times, players are unwilling to play an
interior action during that interval (pure strategies involving such actions are strictly worse).
Another way to appreciate the difference is that, unlike with conventional interior “mixed”
strategies, players are uncertain of the aggregate amount of experimentation undertaken up
to a given time.
Randomization over switching times drives the dispersion of beliefs. Not observing a
breakdown can be explained in two ways: either the other players have not yet begun
experimenting, or the state of the world is good. A player’s own choice of action helps him
sort through these competing explanations: the earlier he began experimenting himself, the
more likely he is to believe that the lack of a breakdown can be attributed to the state of the
world being good rather than to the other players waiting to experiment. In the absence of
a breakdown, beliefs about the state remain private at all times: while there exists a finite
time at which players commonly know that everyone is experimenting, they still do not know
when everyone else began experimenting.
Why do players mix? Two forces are combined here. The first and familiar force is
mentioned above: free-riding prevents players from adopting the same extremal pure strategy.
If one’s opponent is switching to the risky arm at a given time, then a player’s best reply
can involve experimenting immediately to avoid wasting time, as nothing will be learnt until
then, or taking advantage of his experimentation by choosing to wait long enough to benefit
from it. In standard experimentation models, this force drives the players’ equilibrium
choice of interior actions. Here, a second force compels players to choose extremal actions.
Experimentation breeds experimentation: a player who deviates from an interior action to
an action that places greater emphasis on the risky arm will see his choice confirmed by the
absence of a breakdown; this observation makes him more optimistic about the state of the
world. If he were indifferent between risky and safe if he had not deviated, his deviation
would have led him to strictly prefer experimentation in the future. In a sense, payoffs are
convex in the weight assigned to the risky action.
3
This equilibrium adds two sources of inefficiency (dispersion in practices and dispersion
in beliefs) to the familiar cost of under-experimentation: given the overall amount of ex-
perimentation, the dispersion in timing is costly; holding his opponents’ strategies fixed, a
player would be strictly better off if he could determine when his opponents actually began
experimenting.
This last statement extends to equilibrium analysis. As we show, players are better off
in the (symmetric) Markov equilibrium in the game in which they can observe one another’s
actions. They also benefit from a mediator helping them to coordinate their play via private
recommendations.
More radical policy interventions that modify the payoffs of the game can be further
helpful. In particular, risk-sharing has several advantages over other types of interventions.
By risk-sharing, we refer to a well-calibrated group-insurance scheme whereby a player who
suffers a breakdown obtains partial compensation from the other players. First, such a
scheme restores the first-best outcome in contrast to, for instance, externally funded subsidies
that improve the amount of experimentation without solving the coordination problem.
Second, the optimal scheme is robust to the specific monitoring structure: whether players
observe one another’s actions is irrelevant to the calibration of this scheme.
Applications. Our choice to adopt the simplest experimentation model is deliberate, as
it makes the analysis as transparent as possible. One could certainly extend some of the
analysis to richer settings.3 However, we believe that even our simple model already captures
the essential features of economically relevant applications and provides useful insights.
Bad-news learning processes naturally occur upon the introduction of a new technology
that promises cost savings over the status quo but entails additional risks. Examples of such
risky technologies that are especially relevant to our model include new drugs and medical
devices; innovative processes such as hydraulic fracturing for oil production; and new crops
in agriculture, such as hybrids and high-yielding varieties.
Although their technological and institutional details differ, these settings share the key
features of our model: (i) Privately observed adoption decisions: there is growing evidence of
significant barriers to information in several markets.4 Factors such as geographical distance,
social and information networks, and costly attention can hinder the observability of other
agents’ actions. (ii) The potential for public catastrophic outcomes: such breakdowns may
3Our earlier working paper provides an analysis of the case in which some learning occurs even in the ab-
sence of experimentation; Section 6 introduces payoff externalities in addition to informational externalities,
and the conclusions discuss the case in which learning remains incomplete even after a breakdown.
4For example, Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2006) document Kenyan farmers’ limited knowledge of their
neighbours’ choice of crops.
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include a malpractice suit following the failure of a new drug or medical equipment; an oil-
drilling accident, such as a spill or a blowout;5 or the loss of an entire harvest. (iii) Weak
market competition (pure informational externalities): drillers and farmers are largely price-
takers, and doctors may not even be aware of other potential adopters of a new device.6 Of
course, when discussing our welfare implications, we must consider cross-market externalities,
such as the environmental impact of an oil-drilling accident.
A growing body of empirical evidence is broadly consistent with our model’s findings. In
particular, Skinner and Staiger (2007) document U.S. state-level variation in the adoption
rates for four technological innovations (hybrid corn, tractors, computers, and beta-blockers)
and suggest informational barriers as a potential explanation. Consistent with the idea that
barriers to information generate cross-sectional heterogeneity in the new technology adoption
rate, Bandiera and Rasul (2006) relate farmers’ decisions to adopt a new crop variety to the
information available in their social networks, Conley and Udry (2010) collect direct data on
social interconnections and document the importance of “information neighbourhoods” for
the local diffusion of fertilizer and other chemicals, and Covert (2014) documents frictions
in drilling companies’ learning processes regarding the relationship between inputs and oil
production.
With monitoring used as a design variable, our results in Section 6.1 help explain the
information sharing observed in several industries. Indeed, in health care, industry associ-
ations and government agencies promote the sharing of information on best practices;7 in
oil drilling, regulations encourage sharing information regarding input choices for fracking
operations (see Covert, 2014); and for an example in agriculture, BenYishay and Mobarak
(2014) show how “extension agents” affect the flow of information and technology diffusion
across villages in Malawi.
Finally, our results in Section 6.2 highlight the benefits of risk-sharing agreements and
warn against the ability of externally funded subsidies to reduce dispersion in adoption rates.
These results may suggest an additional explanation for the low and heterogeneous take-up
rates for agricultural subsidies, as documented, for example, by Carter, Laajaj and Yang
5See, for example, “The Downside of the Boom,” The New York Times, November 22, 2014.
6The consequences of informational externalities for technology adoption in the context of agriculture are
the object of a large body of empirical literature. However, most studies of social learning have assumed
unconstrained information flows among potential adopters, i.e., perfect monitoring of actions and outcomes,
at least among subsets of agents. See Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) and Jack (2013) for an overview.
7The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is launching a Unique Device Identifier (UDI) sys-
tem “to adequately identify medical devices through their distribution and use.” The system pro-
vides information on outcomes and indirectly provides data on adoption rates through usage intensity
(http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/UniqueDeviceIdentification/).
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(2013). Surprisingly, although risk-sharing agreements in developing countries have been
widely studied (e.g., Townsend, 1994 and 1995), the link with technology adoption seems
untested thus far.
Related Literature. Our motivation is closest to that of Murto and Välimäki (2011), em-
phasizing the interplay between experimentation and observational learning. In their model,
players receive exogenous (random) private signals over time. In the present study, however,
learning is endogenous, with players’ actions influencing their private beliefs. Another major
difference is that although signals are private in their model, actions (exit or not) are publicly
observed. As a result, the dynamics that they identify are very different from ours, with
waves of exits alternating with what they term “flow modes” until a collapse ends the game.
In our game, however, unless a breakdown occurs, players’ unobserved behaviour leads to
smooth updating of their beliefs, except for the atom at the last switching time assigned a
positive probability.
From a theoretical perspective, our paper is closest to the work of Keller and Rady
(2015) and our earlier paper (Bonatti and Hörner, 2011). Our game differs from the former
in that actions are not observed and differs from the latter in that the news is bad rather
than good.8 The resulting differences are significant: with good news, the equilibrium is
not unique, and the symmetric equilibrium involves interior pure strategies, with experimen-
tation dwindling but never ceasing altogether. With good news, an off-path deviation to
greater experimentation leads to increased pessimism and hence less experimentation; thus,
behaviour is “mean-reverting,” and best replies are necessarily pure and possibly interior.
This behaviour also explains why, in the context of good news, the Markov equilibrium with
observable actions is actually worse than the symmetric equilibrium with unobservable ac-
tions, contrary to what we find with bad news. A comparison with the results of Keller and
Rady is provided in Section 6.1.
As noted, the necessity of considering mixed strategies in our game should not be con-
fused with the necessity of allowing pure actions that are not extremal appearing elsewhere.
To restore existence in games of strategic experimentation without needing to confront the
measure-theoretic difficulties raised by the modeling of independent randomization in con-
tinuous time, various authors (e.g., Bolton and Harris 1999; Keller, Rady and Cripps, 2005;
Keller and Rady, 2015) have redefined the space of actions available to a player at a given
instant to be a convex set (that is, the set of pure strategies is sectionally convex). This redef-
inition is usually achieved by simple convexification, replacing the lotteries over {0, 1} by the
interval [0, 1] (with the interpretation of players choosing how to allocate a unit resource),
8Another difference is that the game of Bonatti and Hörner (2011) features payoff externalities.
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but is not always accomplished in this way: in Keller and Rady (2003), this redefinition
involves players choosing two actions at every instant–a mean price and a mean variance. In
these papers, this redefinition suffices to restore the existence of an equilibrium in pure (but
not extremal) strategies.9,10 In fact, there are special games for which privately randomizing
over stopping times and using non-extremal pure strategies are equivalent. The question of
whether to describe equilibrium strategies with a hazard rate or with a pure strategy taking
value in a convexified set is then merely a matter of convenience. Examples include wars of
attrition (for instance, Milgrom and Weber, 1985) or more recent versions of timing games
allowing for additional learning (Murto and Välimäki, 2011; Rosenberg, Salomon and Vieille,
2013).
The following is a manifestation of the difference between the equilibria of the games
considered in these papers (whether strategic experimentation or games of timing) and the
approach in our study: in these equilibria, a player is indifferent regarding all his strategies
(over the relevant time interval). In the unique equilibrium of our game, a player is indifferent
over stopping times (over some interval), but he strictly prefers any of these stopping times
to a strategy that uses an interior action over a set of times of positive measure: he is willing
to mix, but not to play the pure strategy that specifies the expected value of the mixture.
We are not aware of another paper with a clear economic interpretation in which mixed
strategies must be considered to ensure existence, despite convex action sets.11 Our paper
shows that such phenomena are both relevant to economic applications and amenable to
mathematical analysis. (See Akcigit and Liu, 2014, Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn, 2014, for
models in which mixed-strategy equilibria might exist.) Note that such equilibria might
also arise when outcomes rather than actions are private, as in Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille
(2007). Although this is not the case in their analysis, it is conceivable that equilibrium
existence calls for such private strategies to be played in related environments. Relatedly,
non-Markovian equilibria might also be required for games with incomplete (rather than
9Pure but non-extremal optimal policies contrast with the solution of decision-theoretic versions of bandit
problems, which admit optimal solutions within the class of extremal policies. See Yushkevich (1988) or
Presman and Sonin (1990).
10One should not confuse such a convexification with some clever application of Kuhn’s theorem that would
obviate mathematical difficulties. Kuhn’s theorem also applies to continuous-time games (see Weizsäcker,
1974, or Shmaya and Solan, 2014), but the set of behavioural strategies (properly defined) is much larger
than the set of pure strategies, even when action sets are convex.
11Of course, it is well known in optimization that sectional convexity is insufficient to guarantee the type
of convexity in the policy space that is required for the existence of solutions of optimal control problems. A
fortiori, the problem arises in games, and there are well-known examples of zero-sum games with sectionally
convex action spaces for which the optimal policies cannot be found within the class of pure policies (see
Karlin, 1959, and references therein).
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imperfect) information and payoff externalities, see Décamps and Mariotti (2004).
Conditional on the state, breakdowns occur independently across players; thus, the het-
erogeneity in outcomes is obviously neither surprising nor original. Dispersion in beliefs
would also be rather expected if players received idiosyncratic, private signals. In this con-
text, however, breakdowns–or their absence–are common-knowledge events. Heterogeneity
in beliefs despite public signals arises in only one other setting of which we are aware: re-
peated games in which players use private strategies (which is precisely what occurs in this
situation). However, our game features incomplete information, not simply imperfect public
monitoring. More important, in contrast to repeated games, equilibria in private strategies
are not merely some of many possibilities: the equilibrium that we solve for is the unique
equilibrium of the game.
Indeed, uniqueness of equilibrium is another surprising result, given the literature on
strategic experimentation. By contrast, Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), Bonatti and Hörner
(2011) and Keller and Rady (2015) admit multiple equilibria, whereas Bolton and Harris
(1999) do not attempt to characterize any equilibrium beyond the symmetric equilibrium.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
Time is continuous, and the horizon is infinite. Players i = 1, . . . , I (I ≥ 2) choose an action
ui ∈ [0, 1] at all times.
There is a binary state of the world ω ∈ {B,G}. Players assign a common prior prob-
ability p0 ∈ (0, 1) to the event {ω = B}. Conditional on ω, player i’s action controls the
instantaneous intensity of a conditionally independent Poisson process {N it : t ≥ 0}. The
process N it is interpreted as the number of lump-sum payoffs observed up to time t. That
is, the action paths ui = (uit)
∞
t=0, alongside ω, define the instantaneous intensity of an inho-
mogeneous Poisson process with intensity λ(t) := λ1{ω=B}(1 − u
i
t), where λ > 0 and 1A is
the indicator function of an event A. Note that this intensity is zero if ω = G, independent
of the actions chosen. When ui = 1, player i exclusively pulls the safe arm, as this choice
prevents the occurrence of (costly) lump sums.12 When player i sets ui to 0, we state that
he pulls the risky arm exclusively. Unless a player pulls the safe arm only, he might learn
12It might be desirable to allow for “background learning” such that learning is slowed when the safe arm
is pulled but does not come to a halt. That is, we may assume that λ(t) := λ1{ω=B}(ū/I−u
i
t), where ū > I.
Clearly, long-run beliefs are very different in that case. However, as we explain in Section 6.2, there is no
discontinuity in payoffs or equilibrium policies.
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about the state. Hence, we state that player i experiments when ui < 1.
Each lump sum entails a cost h > 0. That is, given an integrable function ui = (uit) and
the realization of the process {N it : t ≥ 0}, the realized cost of player i is given by
∫ ∞
0
re−rt(hdN it + su
i
tdt),
where r, s > 0. Note that this is a game of informational externalities only, as player j 6= i’s
actions do not enter player i’s cost.
Throughout this setup, we assume that player i observes the realization of the processes
{N it : i ∈ I}, the breakdowns, and can condition his action on it; however, he observes
nothing else. In particular, player i does not observe past values of ujt , j 6= i. That is,
players observe outcomes but not actions.
We assume that g := λh > s. Therefore, conditional on {ω = B}, to minimize the
expected cost, it is optimal to allocate the resource exclusively to the safe arm, that is, to set
uit = 1 ∀t. Conditional on {ω = G}, the risky arm is optimal, independent of other players’
actions.
Hence, player i’s problem reduces to a course of action up to the first arrival of a lump sum
for any player, as it is strictly dominant to pull the safe arm thereafter. Let τ ∈ R+∪{+∞}
be the time of this first arrival. (Note that τ = +∞ if ω = G.) Therefore, we can and do
assume that the game ends at time τ .
A terminal history hτ specifies the stopped action paths {(uit)
τ
t=0 : i = 1, . . . , I} up to









where the last term is the “terminal” cost equal to the expected cost over an infinite horizon
conditional on {ω = B} under uit = 1 ∀t.
Some of the parameters are relevant only in combination. In particular, up to normal-
ization, g and s enter only through the cost-benefit ratio γ := (g − s)/s, and by a standard
change in the variable, the discount rate r and intensity parameter λ appear via the ratio
µ := r/λ only.
2.2 Policies and Equilibrium
A deterministic (or “pure”) policy for player i is a measurable function πi : R+ → [0, 1] that
specifies player i’s action ui at time t conditional on the event {t < τ}.13 Note that the
13The policy does not define behaviour after one’s own deviation, an unnecessary specification given the
information structure. In those rare instances in which we comment on behaviour after such off-path histories,
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range of πi is convex (although the set of deterministic policies is not): we interpret uit as
the share of i’s resources allocated to the safe arm. Let Πi denote the set of all deterministic
policies. Of special importance are stopping policies, which are defined as follows. Given
t ≥ 0, let πit be the policy that sets π
i
t(s) = 1 for s < t and π
i
t(s) = 0 for s ≥ t. The set of
stopping policies is denoted ΠiS.
Ultimately, it is not sufficient to consider deterministic policies. Mixed policies must be
introduced. We adopt the following definition of mixed policies based on Aumann (1964). A
mixed policy is a measurable map φi : [0, 1] → Πi such that for all βi ∈ [0, 1], φi(βi) ∈ Πi.14
This definition can be interpreted as follows: player i privately flips a “coin” at the beginning
of the game, and its realization βi determines the deterministic policy that he then follows.
Let Φi denote the set of (mixed) policies of player i.
Given φ−i ∈ Φ−i := ×j 6=iΦ









over φi ∈ Φi.
Of particular interest are stopping time policies–“random” stopping policies. According
to these policies, for some non-decreasing function ti : [0, 1] → R+, φ
i(βi) = πiti(βi) (a.s.).
Hence, in these policies, player i randomizes over the time that he stops pulling the safe
arm. Let ΦiS denote the set of stopping time policies of player i (including Π
i
S). It is often
more convenient to represent such policies using the distribution function F i : R+ → [0, 1],
defined as F i(t) := sup{βi | ti(βi) ≤ t}; that is, ti is the quantile function of F i.
Given that players do not observe one another’s actions, there is no loss in considering
Nash equilibria. Hence, an equilibrium is a vector φ∗ ∈ Φ := ×iΦ
i such that for all i and
for all βi ∈ [0, 1], φ∗i(βi) minimizes Cφ
i
over φi ∈ Φi, given φ∗−i. Of particular interest
are symmetric equilibria, which are equilibria in which φj = φi for all i, j. However, our
attention is not restricted to those equilibria.
3 Learning
Players face two sources of uncertainty. First, they do not know the state of the world. As
time passes without lump sums occurring, they learn about the state. Second, players do
we use the word “strategy” instead.
14Let B[0,1] (resp., B) denote the σ-algebra of Borel sets of [0, 1] (resp., R+) with the Lebesgue measure.
We endow the set of measurable functions from (R+,B) to ([0, 1],B[0,1]) with the σ-algebra generated by
sets of the form {f : f(s) ∈ A} with s ∈ R+ and A ∈ B[0,1]. The notion that such a definition is equivalent
to the use of “behavioural decision rules” follows from Weizsäcker (1974). See also Shmaya and Solan (2014)
on the equivalence and Touzi and Vieille (2002) on mixed policies in timing games.
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not know the specific deterministic policy selected by the other players–if indeed this policy
was chosen at random. In this regard, time is also informative: because lump sums are more
likely if others pull the risky arm, the absence of such lump sums is indicative of safe play.
Both sources of uncertainty affect the choice of optimal action: if player i knew that others
were experimenting, then he might be tempted to “free-ride” on this experimentation and
pull the safe arm unless he is very optimistic (about the risky arm being the correct one).
Nonetheless, we argue here that it is unnecessary for player i’s belief to be “multidimensional.”
As we show below, a one-dimensional statistic suffices.
A second difficulty is that players’ beliefs are private. A player who adopts a riskier
policy becomes optimistic at a faster pace than if he had adopted a safer policy; indeed, if he
pulled the safe arm exclusively, he would only learn from others. This statement implies that
other players do not know player i’s beliefs. Those players have a belief about his belief, as
in equilibrium, they know the distribution over deterministic policies that player i is using.15
However, given player i’s policy, all these beliefs (including higher-order beliefs) are de-
rived from a common source of information: time. Because the game ends with the first
lump sum, there is only one information set corresponding to a given time t (conditional on
i’s policy throughout). Player i faces no “uncertainty” regarding these conditional beliefs:
he can perfectly forecast at time t what his beliefs will be at any time t′ > t, conditional on
no lump sum occurring in the meantime. In particular, he can forecast the instantaneous
probability with which a lump sum will occur on that date–but this forecast reflects the
two sources of uncertainty that he faces. This hazard rate process is all that matters for
determining best replies.
Formally, fix a player i throughout. Define pit := P
φ




s=0] for t < τ . As the
conditioning clearly indicates, it is player i’s belief and his only, although we occasionally
omit the superscript. Two properties of his belief process are important. First, we can
express the probability of the event that no breakdown has occurred by time t, denoted ∅t,
















Second, we can derive the law of motion of the (deterministic) process pit taking into ac-
count the uncertainty regarding the realized policies π−i used by other players. Given that
15However, this second-order belief is not common knowledge because player j’s posterior belief regarding
i’s adopted policy depends on j’s belief regarding the state of the world, which depends on his own policy
(which is not known to others).
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breakdowns follow an exponential distribution, the probability of no breakdown by time t,
conditional on {ω = B} and (uis)
t
s=0, is given by
P
φ







































p0[∅t | ω = B]
P
φ
















Because the first term on the right-hand side is only a function of player i’s own action,




p0[∅t | ω = B]
P
φ











− λ(I − uit).
Indeed, player i’s belief (as measured by the log-likelihood ratio) is private, but his private
information appears additively, as captured by the second term on the right-hand side.
The contribution to his belief attributable to all other players’ expected policies is common
knowledge.













Note that ν−it ∈ [0, I − 1] because u
j
s ∈ [0, 1], all s ≤ t, j 6= i.
This can be interpreted as the expected contribution from the other players’ experimen-
tation to the hazard rate of player i’s belief. Player j 6= i’s experimentation affects player i’s
belief revision at time t, and it is not simply a matter of whether player j is playing safe at
that time. The entire path of player j’s actions affects player i’s belief regarding the state of
the world at time t and, hence, how much this belief must be revised if no breakdown occurs
in the next instant.













Because the function ν−i plays an important role in the analysis, it is important to develop
some intuition for it. Suppose that players use stopping time policies such that φ ∈ ΦS.
Hence, players switch from the safe arm to the risky arm at time t according to some
distribution function F j : R+ → [0, 1]. Write F̄
j = 1−F j for the complementary distribution
12
function. This approach also allows us to provide an alternative, perhaps more expressive,
















































F̄ jt . (5)
It follows that ν−it is a function that begins at I − 1, remains there as long as F
j(t) = 0 for
all j 6= i, discontinuously decreases when F j discontinuously increases for some j 6= i, and
continuously increases when t /∈ ∪j 6=i suppF
j, strictly, unless it is equal to 0, which occurs
when F j(t) = 1 for all j 6= i.16 It always exceeds the total probability of others not having
stopped pulling their risky arm, as the likelihood of a breakdown is lowest when they have
not yet done so, and player i must entertain the possibility that they already have begun
pulling the risky arm.
Figure 1 illustrates this scenario for the case of two players from the perspective of player
i: in the case of some (arbitrary) pure policy (when player j selects a deterministic policy
uj), the hazard rate ν−i coincides with it; in the case of a mixed policy, ν−i and F̄ j coincide


































Figure 1: Hazard rate ν−i compared with F̄ j, uj, I = 2.
16Given a distribution G, we write suppG for the set of points of increases in G.
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4 Best Replies
This section elucidates the structure of the best-reply function of a fixed player i, taking
the behaviour of others as given, as summarized by the hazard rate ν−i. This procedure
involves five steps. First, we explain why this hazard rate is indeed a summary statistic
for the best-reply problem. Second, we show that any best reply is necessarily a stopping
time policy. Third, we derive the unique cooperative solution as an immediate by-product, in
which ν−i = I−1. Fourth, in the case of two players, we solve for the best-reply function and
show how its structure–first increasing and then decreasing to 0–eliminates the possibility
of the existence of an equilibrium in pure policies. Fifth, we explain why this non-existence
extends to the case of more than two players.
4.1 The Certainty-Equivalent Problem
The optimization problem faced by player i satisfies certainty equivalence: the optimal ac-
tion uit is exactly the same as it would be if all unknowns were known and if their values
equaled their best estimates (the conditional expectations), given by (pi, ν−i). Furthermore,
a separation principle holds: optimal estimation and optimal control can be decoupled. As
clearly illustrated in the definition of (pi, ν−i), the choice of ui does not affect this estimate.
As an illustration of this, according to the law of iterated expectations, we may now
































This is the program P.17 Here, the function ν−i : R+ → [0, I − 1] is treated as an exogenous
(measurable) function. We omit it as an explicit argument of P. By the Filippov-Cesari
theorem (see Cesari, 1983), a solution exists, that is to say, the infimum is achieved. We will
examine the necessary conditions given by Pontryagin’s maximum principle.
The interpretation of the objective is as follows. As explained above, (1−p0)/(1−pit) is the
probability of reaching time t without a breakdown. At that time, if player i invests uit in the
safe arm, then the instantaneous probability that he suffers a breakdown is (1−uit)λp
i
tdt, with
the expected cost rh. If any of the players has a breakdown (which occurs with probability






t )dt), then player i switches to the safe arm, yielding the net present cost s.
As was the case for learning dynamics, the pair (pi, ν−i) also summarizes all the information
that matters for computing payoffs.
4.2 Stopping Time Policies
Here, we show that any best reply must be within the class of stopping time policies.
Lemma 1 If πi ∈ Πi solves P, then πi ∈ ΠiS.
Informally, Lemma 1 states that if a player begins experimenting, he should do so indefinitely
(i.e., until a breakdown occurs), and conversely, if he plays safe, he must have played safe at
all earlier times. To gain further intuition, consider the arbitrage equation of player i, which
describes the trade-off between backloading and frontloading experimentation. This equation
is silent regarding the optimal amount of experimentation at time t and suggests only the
optimal timing of a fixed amount of experimentation. The marginal value of backloading
















The first term is the time-preference effect of delaying the expected flow cost ptg and
anticipating the cost s. The second term pertains to the event of a breakdown (at rate
λpit
(




): if so, safe play would occur at t + dt regardless of the player’s earlier
action; in that event, pulling the safe arm more at t yields marginal savings of g−s. Finally,
the third term considers the effect of the player’s action on the likelihood of a breakdown:
by frontloading safe play, the player reduces (at a rate λpit) the arrival of a breakdown, in
which case he would switch from the current action uit to u
i = 1; because this scenario can
occur only in the bad state, this action yields a loss g − s.
Note that the sum of the last two terms is non-negative. Hence, equation (7) implies
that backloading is profitable when p is sufficiently large. Conversely, if a player were certain
that the state is good, discounting would suggest frontloading the risky action. Lemma 1
then establishes that over the relevant range of beliefs (i.e., for pi ≥ p∗; see Lemma 2), the
marginal value of backloading is positive.
Finally, note that Lemma 1 does not imply that the solution to P is unique; rather,
it implies that all deterministic solutions are in ΠiS. Furthermore, one can determine the
bounds on how early or late a player is willing to switch to the risky arm. Next, we provide



















where we recall that γ = (g − s)/s and µ = r/λ. As is immediately observed from the
formula, p∗∗ > p∗, given I ≥ 2. The next result establishes that once a player becomes
sufficiently optimistic (specifically, when pit < p
∗), he allocates his entire resource to the
risky arm.
Lemma 2 If πi solves P, then uit = 0 for all t such that p
i
t < p
∗. Conversely, if uit = 0 yet
pit > p
∗, then ν−it > 0.
The belief p∗ is the threshold value at which a player is willing to experiment if all
other players are pulling the risky arm thereafter. Lemma 2 establishes a lower bound
on experimentation because, intuitively, the temptation to free-ride is strongest when all
other players are pulling the risky arm. Hence, if p0 < p∗, we have finished: in the unique
equilibrium, all players choose uit = 0 at all times. In what follows, we assume that p
0 ≥ p∗.
The next result establishes that at least one player must assign positive probability to
switching to the risky arm no later than when his belief reaches p∗∗.
Lemma 3 If ν−it = I − 1 and player i’s best reply is F̄
i(t) = 1, then pit ≥ p
∗∗.
It can be shown (previewing the cooperative solution characterized below) that the upper
bound on the amount of experimentation p∗∗ coincides with the threshold belief for the
single-agent problem. This theme is familiar in exponential-bandit models (Keller, Rady and
Cripps, 2005, and Bonatti and Hörner, 2011) in which players are not willing to experiment
more than in the single-player case. However, in contrast to good-news models, in which
equilibrium beliefs “reach” the stopping region, the lower bound p∗ depends on the number
of players because of the amount of information generated by I − 1 players pulling the risky
arm.
4.3 Cooperative Solution
We briefly mention the cooperative solution, which is easily derived from the previous re-
sult. Assume that players perfectly observe one another’s actions (an innocuous assumption
because the optimum involves pure policies) and choose them so as to minimize the sum of










Note that pFB is larger than p∗∗, given I ≥ 2. In fact, it coincides with p∗∗ and hence also
p∗ when I = 1 is inserted into the formulas.
Given a pair (p, u) such that p is the belief path generated by u :=
∑
i u
i, given p0, along
the history with no breakdown, the action path (ut)t is measurable with respect to the belief
path (pt)t if pt = pt′ ⇒ ut = ut′ for all t, t
′. We write u(p) for the value of u of belief p ≤ p0,
which is then well defined. The cooperative solution given in the next lemma is measurable
with respect to its belief path.
Unsurprisingly, the optimal policy involves having all players employ the safe arm until
belief pFB is reached and then switching to the risky arm. This approach is stated below
(see also Keller and Rady 2015, Proposition 1). The next lemma also establishes that total
costs decrease in the intensity with which the risky arm is pulled, as long as the ranking of
intensities holds pointwise in the beliefs.
Lemma 4 The cooperative solution uFB is given by uFBt = I for all t such that pt ≥ p
FB
and uFBt = 0 otherwise. Furthermore, let p
′, p′′ : R+ → R be two feasible paths such that
the corresponding action paths u′, u′′ are measurable with respect to their belief path, with
uFB(p) ≤ u′(p) ≤ u′′(p) for all p ≤ p0. The cost is then weakly lower under p′ than under p′′
and strictly lower when u′(p′t) < u
′′(p′t) for a set of times t of positive measure.
4.4 Best Replies with Two Players
To understand why equilibrium is necessarily in mixed policies (unless p0 /∈ (p∗, p∗∗)), it is
useful to derive the best-reply correspondence in the special case of two players. Suppose
that player j 6= i switches (with probability one) to the risky arm at time tj . We may
distinguish player i’s cost according to whether he switches to the safe arm first or second.
If player i decides to go second, he must do so when his private belief reaches the threshold
p∗ (or immediately if this belief has been reached by the time j switches). Hence, if going
second is best, then player i’s best reply must be









The fixed delay is equal to the time required for beliefs to reach the threshold p∗ based on
player j’s experimentation alone.
If i decides to go first, then player i will begin experimenting immediately, conditional
on wanting to preempt player j. Intuitively, player i will not learn before time tj unless
he experiments. If player i is not willing to wait until then, he should begin immediately.









Best-reply curve of 1
Best-reply curve of 2
Figure 2: Best-reply curves with two players for (r, λ, γ, p0) = (1/10, 1, 4, 1/2).
pessimistic, then player i will choose to “freeze” beliefs until tj . This scenario is intuitive:
the incentive to wait and “be second” only grows as time passes: if a player were to delay his
decision to switch to the risky arm, then his incentive to move second would only grow, as he
would have to wait for less time before benefiting from the other player’s experimentation.
Hence, if moving first is the preferred course of action, then moving immediately is best.
What remains to be determined is when player i prefers to go first or second. This
preference depends on when player j switches. Unsurprisingly, the larger tj is, the more
tempting it is to go first. Intuitively, if tj is very high, then the cost of waiting until player
j’s actions take beliefs to the threshold causes an overly costly delay in learning. Conversely,
when player j is expected to switch to the risky arm soon, the benefits of free-riding on his
experimentation when beliefs are most pessimistic outweigh the cost of delay. This scenario
is summarized by the following lemma.

















if tj < t̂,
{








if tj = t̂,
0 if tj > t̂.
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Consequently, player i’s best-reply curve shifts downward at t̂. The two best-reply curves do
not cross, and no pure-policy equilibrium exists. Figure 2 provides an illustration.
If player j uses precisely t̂, then player i has two best replies. However, consider Figure 2:
for each of his choices, player j’s best reply would be much smaller than p̂ (indeed, it would








if he uses 0). Unsurprisingly,
regardless of how player i randomizes between these two choices, player j’s best reply is
strictly lower than t̂. We immediately obtain the following result.
Lemma 6 Suppose that I = 2 and p0 > p∗. There exists no equilibrium in which either
player uses a pure policy.
4.5 More Than Two Players
Can an equilibrium in pure policies exist when I > 2? Deriving best-reply curves is no longer
an easy task. However, a pure-policy equilibrium cannot exist based on the following simple
argument. Suppose that such an equilibrium exists, and let ti denote the time at which player
i switches to the risky arm. Without loss of generality, suppose that t1 ≥ t2 ≥ · · · . Suppose
first that p(t3) > p∗. Consider the game starting at time t3 and the corresponding initial
belief p(t3). This game involves only two players, players 1 and 2 (assuming indeed that t3
is optimal for player 3). A necessary condition for the policy profile to be an equilibrium is
that players 1 and 2 play mutual best replies in this game–yet the two-player game admits
no pure-policy equilibrium. If instead p(t3) = p∗, then given Lemma 3, because p(tI) ≥ p∗∗,
there exists j such that p(tj) > p∗ = p(tj−1) = · · · = p(t1). As in the two-player case, past




We now turn to the equilibrium analysis. Recall that we assume throughout that p0 > p∗.
Given F−i and, hence, given ν−i, each time τ ∈ suppF i is such that the stopping policy
πiτ is a solution to P. Furthermore, it holds that, given any τ ∈ suppF
i, pτ ≥ p
∗. We let
τ̄ i := max{τ ∈ R+ : τ ∈ suppF
i}.
18For any number of players I, the proof of Lemma 5 establishes that if players −i switch at t = T , then
player i wants to switch at a different time.
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First, we focus on symmetric equilibria and accordingly write F , τ̄ for F i, τ̄ i, unless
we emphasize a given player’s perspective. The next result derives the unique symmetric
equilibrium of the game.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium. If p0 ≥ p∗∗, then the equilibrium
is pure and involves F i(t) = 0 at all times.
If p0 ∈ (p∗, p∗∗), the equilibrium involves mixed policies. Specifically, player i chooses a
stopping policy πt among the set [0, τ̄ ], with τ̄ > 0 and pτ̄ = p
∗; this distribution is positive
and continuous over (0, τ̄) and has an atom at times t = 0, τ̄ .
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Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium distribution (left panel) and compares the complemen-
tary distribution function F̄ it with the hazard rate ν
−i
t (right panel). Recall the two sources
of uncertainty that each player faces. Over time, players learn from their own experience
and from that of others. In particular, as time passes, a player assigns growing weight to the
event in which this opponent has already switched to the risky arm, conditional on which
learning occurs faster. Moreover, the contribution of other another player’s experimentation
to player i’s learning (ν−i) is always smaller than the survival rate of the opponent’s dis-
tribution because, as time passes and no breakdown occurs, player i also assigns growing
weight to subsequent realizations of his opponent’s switching time, which slows this learning
process.
The maximum range of stopping times in the symmetric equilibrium has a natural in-
terpretation: the “earliest” that a player may switch to the risky arm is when his belief is
p∗∗: this is the belief for which he would switch if he were on his own (cf. Section 4.3). The
latest he might switch is when his belief reaches p∗: this would be his uniquely optimal belief
if all others were always experimenting. Because his opponents’ behaviour lies somewhere
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Figure 3: Equilibrium distributions F it (left), F̄
i
t and hazard rate ν
−i
t (right) for
(r, λ, γ, I, p0) = (1/10, 1, 4, 3, 1/2).
In contrast to typical mixed-strategy equilibria of normal-form games, player j does not
need to randomize over stopping policies to make player i indifferent over all stopping times
in the relevant time interval. He could just as easily play a deterministic policy uj = ν−i.
The reason that players randomize is that player j is not willing to play such a deterministic
but interior policy. Randomizing over stopping policies is the unique cost-minimizing way
to make player i indifferent over stopping times. This fact has rich implications for the
dispersion of equilibrium beliefs.
Figure 4 illustrates belief paths as a function of time and behaviour. For instance, pc
is the belief path of player i who chooses the latest possible equilibrium stopping time, τ̄ .
The solid line indicates when he pulls the safe arm; the dashed line indicates when he has
already switched to the risky arm. Trajectories pa and pb correspond to earlier switching
stopping times. Once the player begins pulling the risky arm, his belief decreases faster,
reinforcing his preference for the risky arm (absent any breakdown). Trajectories pd and pe
are “counterfactual” trajectories in which player i is more pessimistic than is possible. He
then has an incentive to pull the safe arm longer than in equilibrium and to switch once
his belief reaches p∗, which is later than the latest possible equilibrium time at which his
opponents might have switched.
This elucidates the “off-path” behaviour of player i. After an arbitrary history (uis)
t
s=0
(along which he might have deviated from the prescribed behaviour), Lemmas 1–2 remain
valid: player i’s optimal policy is a stopping policy (from time t onward) that prescribes
stopping no later than the first time his belief reaches p∗.
Finally, the necessity to randomize is a robust phenomenon: as Figure 2 clearly indi-
cates, given that best-reply curves vary continuously with the parameters, the non-existence
of pure-policy equilibrium is robust to perturbations in parameters, regardless of whether















Figure 4: Belief trajectories for (γ, p0, I, µ) = (3, 13/20, 2, 1/8).
arm is pulled, no learning occurs. Our results generalize to the case containing background
learning. In that case, even if the initial belief is above p∗∗, players use stopping time poli-
cies in the unique symmetric equilibrium, which is mixed. However, the smallest stopping
policy with the support of randomization has a stopping time that is strictly positive and
that precisely corresponds to the time when their belief reaches p∗∗. Background learning is
further discussed in Section 6.2 below.
Derivation of the equilibrium distribution. Fix the other players’ behaviour in terms
of ν−it , and consider player i’s stopping time. The first-order effect of playing safe longer
(differentiating (6)) is given by
e−µT
1− pT









The first term (which is negative) captures the myopic benefit (cost reduction) of playing
safe longer. The second term is instead the added cost of slower learning, which is captured
by a higher hazard rate of a breakdown at all future times.
Pointwise indifference requires the marginal cost of playing safe longer to be nil over the
entire support. Thus, we turn to the second-order effect of playing safe, which is given by
22






















µg + (I − ν−it )s
)
dt.
The second-order effect is given by (a) the delayed myopic benefit, (b) the lower myopic
benefit (note that (I− ν−iT −1)pT/(1−pT ) is the derivative of the hazard rate), (c) the post-
poned cost of diminished learning, and (d) the higher marginal cost of diminished learning
(because the hazard rate is exponential in ui). Because the first-order condition must hold
pointwise, the last term is equal to the myopic (first-order) benefit of delaying switching.
These four terms can be combined into an expression characterizing the equilibrium ν−i





I + µ− ν−i − 1
)
− s(µ+ 1). (8)
Note that these beliefs are those of the most pessimistic type, i.e., the player who has not
yet switched to the risky arm.
Next, we use the state equation to derive ν−it as a function of time alone. We then derive



























and we then plug the formula for ν−it .
5.2 Uniqueness
As discussed above, no equilibrium in pure (deterministic) policies exists, regardless of sym-
metry. Thus, asymmetric equilibria in mixed policies is possible. As Figure 2 clarifies, our
game is not supermodular: in particular, best-reply curves are not monotone, which makes
it difficult to establish uniqueness. This implies the failure of standard methods to prove
uniqueness.19 Moreover, the different methods and tricks described in Karlin (1959) do not
19See Vives (1999) for an excellent discussion. Because best-reply curves are downward sloping, existing
arguments based on supermodular games are ineffective; the best-reply function is not a contraction either
(otherwise, the equilibrium would be pure), and the fact that the equilibrium is mixed implies that the
Gale-Nikaido theorem or the Poincaré-Hopf theorem cannot work either or rather that one should work with
the mixed-strategy space directly and possibly use an infinite-dimensional extension of those.
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appear to be effective. In the case of two players, it can be shown that no such equilibrium
exists.20 Our proof carries no philosophical charm and is based on particular features of the
payoff function.
Theorem 2 Assume that I = 2. The equilibrium is then unique (and thus equal to the
mixed equilibrium of Theorem 1).
Uniqueness contrasts with the multiplicity that is prevalent in games with strategic ex-
perimentation, not only when actions are observable (Keller, Rady and Cripps, 2005; Keller
and Rady, 2015) but also when they are not (Bonatti and Hörner, 2011). Because of the
pervasive free-riding incentives, asymmetric equilibria typically exist when players alternate
(finitely or infinitely often) between experimenting and taking advantage of the opponent’s
experimentation–leading to the existence of additional asymmetric equilibria. By contrast,
in our game, free-riding finds its expression in how early a player is willing to begin experi-
menting; the earlier the opponent begins experimenting, the later the player finds it optimal
to do so. However, the ordering of actions is unambiguous: for a given total amount of
experimentation, it is always optimal to use a stopping policy, pulling the safe arm if and
only if a threshold time has not yet been reached.21 It is impossible to determine a player’s
incentives to use a policy that would involve pulling the risky arm before the safe arm,
precluding any type of alternation in the experimentation that players conduct.
5.3 Comparative Statics
As the number of players increases, the free-rider problem worsens in terms of both the
timing and the amount of experimentation.
In computing beliefs, we encounter a difficulty: the belief that player i holds at a given
time is not uniquely determined in the mixed equilibrium; the earlier a player stops, the lower
is his belief at a given time t, provided that no breakdown has occurred. We are thus led to
adopt the perspective of an outside observer who observes nothing at all: conditional on a
given time t being reached without a breakdown under either informational assumption, what
probability does he attach to the event {ω = B}? In the observable case, this belief coincides
with that of any player on path. In the unobservable case, it is some weighted average of a
player’s belief where the weight reflects the probability attached by this observer to a player
20For more than two players, uniqueness is an open problem.
21This is also the key reason why the equilibrium must be in mixed policies and not in pure policies with
non-extremal actions: for a given amount of experimentation, players have strict incentives to backload,
eliminating the possibility of pulling arms with non-extremal intensity over any interval of time.
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switching to risky play at a given time, suitably updated given that time t is reached without
a breakdown. Formally, we compute
pt = P
φ
p0[ω = B | ∅t],
where, unlike in Section 3, we do not condition on any particular player’s action path. It
follows that the outside observer’s belief satisfies
ṗt = −pt(1− pt)I(1− ν
i
t).
For the purpose of the next proposition, we index distributions and stopping times, among
others, by the number of players I ≥ 1.
Proposition 1
1. The distributions F I are ranked by stochastic dominance: F It decreases in I, for all t.




t for all I
′ > I, with strict inequality for all t < τ̄I′.




t once (from above).
4. For all I > 1, total individual costs in the symmetric equilibrium are given by
p0(gµ+ s)− µs. (9)
In summary, as the number of players increases, the “mixing phase” lasts longer (until
τ̄I) and drives beliefs to a lower threshold p
∗. The worsening free-riding problem implies
full dissipation of the positive informational externalities generated by an additional player.
Moreover, adding one player does not modify the upper bound on experimentation p∗∗.
Thus, although the social planner would like to experiment even under more pessimistic
prior beliefs, there can be no experimentation in equilibrium if the prior is below a constant
threshold.
The distributions of stopping times Ft with different I are ranked by first-order stochas-
tic dominance: a larger number of players increases the likelihood of later stopping times.
Furthermore, the expected hazard rate from the outside observer’s perspective I − νIt is de-
creasing in I as long as p∗ has not been reached. The outside observer’s beliefs facing I ′ > I
players eventually overtake the beliefs that he would hold with I players. In Figure 5, we


















I = 2 I = 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4t t
Figure 5: Hazard rate and belief paths for (µ, γ, p0) = (1/4, 1, 1/2).
6 Remedies: Information and Subsidies
Given the inefficiencies of the equilibrium outcome, it is natural to ask what interventions
could possibly be helpful. The first possibility is to provide more information to the players.
For instance, does better monitoring help in this scenario, in contrast to good-news models?
If an intermediary could provide private recommendations to the players, what would he do?
These questions are examined in the first subsection. In the second, we consider the scope
for transfers (specifically, subsidies and cross-insurance) in improving the outcome.
6.1 The Role of Information
6.1.1 Perfect Monitoring
We begin by recalling Keller and Rady’s result regarding symmetric Markov equilibria in the
game with observable actions. Players are restricted to Markov policies ui : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
with the left limit pt− of the common posterior belief as the state variable. Policies are























where W−1 is the (negative branch of the) Lambert function. We also define u


















if p ∈ [p∗, p̄),
0 if p < p∗.
Theorem 3 (Keller and Rady, 2015) The unique symmetric Markov equilibrium is given
by uo.
It is worth emphasizing that this is not the unique Markov equilibrium: asymmetric Markov
equilibria exist, and the ranking in terms of welfare can go either way. (See Section 3.3 of
Keller and Rady, 2015.) Theorem 3 is established by Keller and Rady (2015), although they
do not provide the closed-form expression for the policy, and the reader is referred to their
paper for a proof of this result.
Under observable actions, players benefit from a larger group, although not at the same
rate as the social planner. Furthermore, as the number of players (and hence the value of
information) grows, the first-best policy eventually involves immediate full experimentation.
Each player’s cost then converges to its level under complete information: the arrival rate of
a breakdown grows, conditional on the bad state, and the probability of suffering a break-
down is inversely proportional to I. This relationship cannot be found when actions are
not observable because experimentation does not even begin unless p0 < p∗∗. Even under
observable actions, the threshold belief p̄ for experimentation to begin is increasing in I
but converges to a finite value. Furthermore, the duration of the mixing phase does not
decline as the number of players grows. Therefore, the cost under complete information is
not attainable if p0 > p∗.
Next, we compare the total amount of experimentation up to some t under both ob-




t for these beliefs, depending on
whether we consider the observable, unobservable or cooperative case, respectively. We can
show stronger results than the ranking of the belief paths. For the unobservable case, let
ν(p) := νt(p), where t(p) denotes the time at which the outside observer’s belief reaches a
value of p. Formally, we can show that ν(p) is ranked across the three cases.
Proposition 2 The following inequalities hold for all p
νn(p) ≥ νo(p) ≥ νFB(p).
The second inequality is strict when p < pFB, and the first is strict when po < p̄. In
particular, p̄ > p∗∗.
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with strict inequalities as described in the previous proposition. Furthermore, Lemma 4
implies the ranking of the symmetric equilibrium costs C(p0).
Corollary 1 The following inequalities hold for all p = p0
Cn(p) ≥ Co(p) ≥ CFB(p).
Both inequalities are strict when p > p∗ and µ > 0.
Hence, monitoring is helpful in our context, although it is not helpful with good news.22
The basic intuition is easy to grasp: when actions are observable, a player’s incentive to
deviate is related not only to the direct cost or benefit from this deviation but also to the
indirect cost or benefit in terms of the change in actions by other players. By deviating to
the risky arm, a player accelerates the common learning that, in the absence of news, leads to
greater optimism and more experimentation by others; this outcome is good because players
do not experiment enough. By contrast, with good news, experimentation by a player leads
to greater pessimism in the absence of news and hence depresses experimentation provision.
6.1.2 Coordination
Forcing players to disclose their actions might not be easy to achieve in practice. A less dras-
tic intervention might involve introducing a disinterested intermediary who makes private
but correlated recommendations to each player regarding when they should begin exper-
imenting. Mediation is a particularly weak form of intervention; it is self-enforcing and
costless. Its formal implementation requires no more than a private correlation device, but
in practice, this mediation is undertaken by trade associations, political representatives, or
any institution commonly involved in the social dialogue.
Clearly, the optimal correlation scheme should be in the extensive form: there is no
benefit in telling a player when to switch before the intermediary intends for him to do so,
as telling him the specific stopping time in advance only makes it more difficult to induce
compliance with the recommendation, giving him more information than needed. However,
22See Bonatti and Hörner (2011) and related games with incomplete information. Holmström (1999) is
perhaps the most famous example, although arguably the mechanism through which the lack of observability
operates is very different.
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as we explain, even in the normal form (by telling each player privately at the beginning of
the game when he should stop playing safe), such correlation is helpful.23
Specifically, for the case of two players, consider the joint distribution over switching times
in our symmetric equilibrium, F (t1, t2) = F (t1)F (t2). We construct a new distribution by
slightly perturbing the independent randomization according to a bivariate FGM copula.24
Let ρ denote the correlation parameter of the joint distribution F .
We modify our equilibrium marginal distribution to introduce a small amount of corre-
lation and preserve incentives. At an abstract level, the incentive-compatibility constraint
for obeying the recommendation to switch at time t is a functional equation that is linear
in the distribution F . We can then write this constraint as the combination of two linear
operators K0 and K1. In particular, we have
K0(F ) + ρK1(F ) = 0.
We can use this constraint to capture the restriction that incentives (under a small amount
of correlation) impose on the marginal distribution. In particular, we identify a distribution
that we use to (locally) modify our equilibrium distribution while preserving incentives. We
denote this distribution by F1(t; ρ).
Clearly, regardless of the degree of correlation ρ, no player can begin experimenting before
p∗∗ or after p∗. The design variable is the degree of correlation but requires adjusting the
support of the marginal distribution to match p∗ of the most pessimistic type. In particular,
the mass point at time τ̄ is now a function of ρ. We then differentiate total costs under the
distribution F1(t; ρ) in a neighborhood of ρ = 0.
For any value of the parameters, the derivative of the cost is negative, i.e., positive cor-
relation is beneficial. We conclude that some (possibly small) amount of positive correlation
of switching times (subject to incentive compatibility) improves upon independence.25
However, the role of positive correlation (across switching times) must not be confused
with a simple reduction in the dispersion of practices. Recall that only switching policies are
optimal for any player. It is then important and immediately clear that the symmetric (“co-
ordinated”) pure-policy profile {νit}
I
i=1 yields strictly higher costs than our mixed equilibrium.
23We are unable to solve for the optimal correlation scheme in the extensive form. In fact, even in the
normal form, we are able to solve for it only in the special case of a particular parametrized family of
correlation schemes, as described below. But this case suffices to show that independence is not optimal.
24For a marginal distribution F (t), the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FGM) copula is given by F (t1, t2) =
F (t1)F (t2)(1+ρ(1−F (t1))(1−F (t2))), with parameter ρ ∈ [−1, 1]. See Nelsen (2006). Throughout this case,
we assume symmetry of this distribution, and we introduce an (arbitrarily small amount of) background








t ), with ū > 2.
25The details of the calculations leading to this comparative statics result are in the annotated Mathematica
file correlated.nb on the authors’ websites.
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Again, from each player’s perspective, it is irrelevant whether others randomize (holding ν−i
fixed). However, the best-reply problem admits only switching-policy solutions–it is costlier
for a player to use the pure (non-extremal) policy νit than to use the distribution F
i over
stopping times that is equivalent to νit , from the perspective of the other players.
6.2 The Role of Payoffs
The potentially beneficial role of government policy for technology adoption has been the
subject of a large body of theoretical and empirical literature. We examine the role of policy
interventions and their interaction with the monitoring structure.
We introduce payoff externalities in our model through a cross-subsidization or insurance
scheme: when a breakdown occurs, we assume that the player who suffers this breakdown
receives in turn a fraction α ≤ 1 as compensation, evenly shared by the other players
(throughout this case, we assume that the identity of the player who suffers a breakdown is
observable). Our baseline model corresponds to the special case α = 0.
Formally, the total realized cost of player i is now, given the realization of the process



















To avoid equilibrium multiplicity at least under complete information,26 we assume through-
out that
α < α̂ := γ
I + µ− 1
I + µ
.















(I + µ) ((1 + γ)(1− α)− 1)− γ
.
26With bad news, when payoff externalities are strong, multiple equilibria exist when players are sufficiently
patient, even when neither the actions nor the identity of the player suffering the breakdown is publicly
observed. The absence of payoff externalities is key to the argument that behaviour after the first breakdown
is trivial, as playing safe is then strictly dominant. For instance, if a breakdown entails the same cost to all
players independent of who suffered it and if the state of the world is known to be bad, then one can follow
Abreu, Milgrom and Pearce (1991) in constructing multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria.
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It is easy to observe that p∗∗α and p
∗
α are strictly increasing and continuous in α (when α < α̂
for p∗α and when α < α̃, defined below, for p
∗∗
α ). Furthermore, note that
p∗∗α > p
∗







We obtain the following theorem that generalizes Theorem 1.
Theorem 4 Consider the game with unobservable actions. There exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium.
1. If (10) holds and p0 ∈ (p∗α, p
∗∗
α ), then the equilibrium involves mixed policies. Specifi-
cally, player i chooses a stopping policy πt among the set t ∈ [0, τ̄α], with τ̄α > 0 and
pτ̄α = p
∗
α; this distribution is positive and continuous over (0, τ̄α) and has an atom at
times t = 0, τ̄α. If p
0 ≥ p∗∗α , then equilibrium is pure and involves F
i(t) = 0 at all
times.
2. If (10) does not hold, then the equilibrium involves pure policies. Specifically, player i




t = 0 otherwise.
Thus, even for moderate levels of risk sharing, the equilibrium is in pure (cutoff) policies.
To gain some insight into pure- vs. mixed-policy equilibria, consider the two effects of risk
sharing: on the one hand, players are partially insured against their own breakdowns; on the
other hand, they may need to compensate other players for theirs. When α is sufficiently
large, it is no longer profitable to delay experimentation (free-ride) beyond p∗∗ = p∗: if
others experiment, the risk of needing to pay compensation is too high. Furthermore, it
is not profitable to preempt others because risk sharing shifts the threshold beliefs, which
makes experimentation less attractive.
A significant consequence of Theorem 4 is the following.
Proposition 3 The threshold α∗ in (10) satisfies p∗α∗ = p
FB. Furthermore, α∗ < α̂.
In other words, there exists a cross-subsidy that makes players use the first-best cutoff as
their unique equilibrium policy. In contrast to the analysis of moral hazard in teams by
Holmström (1982), the players in our model can identify individual contributions and can
condition payments on the identity of the agent suffering a breakdown.
Greater experimentation by others is always desirable in terms of the informational ex-
ternality, as it results in more learning. However, more experimentation by others is not
desirable in terms of payoff (cost) externality: a player who shares the cost of other players’
breakdowns prefers less experimentation by others in terms of direct costs. The combina-
tion of positive informational externalities and negative payoff externalities is ambiguous a
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priori. The optimal level of the subsidy precisely offsets the payoff and informational ex-
ternalities, yielding the socially efficient outcome. In particular, the optimal subsidy causes
the two bounds on experimentation to coincide. Recall that the two bounds correspond to
the single-agent thresholds under the two constant policies ν−it ∈ {0, I − 1}. When the two
thresholds coincide, player i is willing to experiment from p∗ onward independent of the
actions of others.
The first-best cost-sharing level α∗ is increasing in the cost of a breakdown γ and in the
number of players I. As we saw in Section 5.3, as either parameter increases, the cost-sharing
rule must cancel the effect of a greater informational externality. A more striking result is
that α∗ is independent of the monitoring structure. In other words, for the right subsidy,
whether actions are observed is irrelevant, and the unique symmetric (in the observable case,
Markov) equilibrium achieves the first-best outcome.
When actions are observable, whether other players experiment too little or too much for a
player’s taste, he can nudge their action towards his preferred action by deviating accordingly.
A policy of playing risky leads to accelerated learning, prompting others to experiment,
whereas playing safe leads to slower learning and delayed experimentation by others. As a
result, one would expect the equilibrium payoff and the amount of experimentation to be
closer to their first-best levels when actions are observable, regardless of whether there is
over-experimentation. In particular, when we obtain first-best outcomes in the unobservable
case, we should also obtain the first-best outcomes with observable actions.





















This threshold generalizes the threshold p̄ introduced in Section 6.1 (that is, p̄0 = p̄). It is
easy to show that this threshold is strictly increasing in α.
We have the following generalization of Theorem 3 (we omit the specification of the
precise amount assigned to the risky arm in the interior region).
Theorem 5 Consider the game with observable actions.
1. For α ∈ [0, α∗], a unique symmetric Markov equilibrium exists. The safe arm is pulled
for p ≥ p̄α, the risky arm is pulled for p ≤ p
∗
α, and the amount assigned to the safe
arm is continuous and strictly increasing in the range of p ∈ [p∗α, p̄α].
2. For α ∈ (α∗, α̂), multiple symmetric Markov equilibria exist, indexed by an (arbitrary)
value p∗ ∈ [p














Figure 6: Pure- and mixed-policy equilibria with subsidies for (I, µ, γ) = (2, 1/4, 3).
The multiplicity for α > α∗ reflects complementarities among the players’ actions: if other
players switch to the risky action, then there are strict benefits of also doing so. The choice
p∗ = p
B
α is that for which smooth-pasting holds at the boundary. Figure 6 illustrates these
boundaries.
The analysis substantiates our discussion: for α > α∗, over-experimentation is observed
irrespective of whether actions are observed, but the extent of this over-experimentation is
worsened by the lack of observability. Similarly, for α < α∗, under-experimentation is the
result, and a lack of observability worsens this outcome. Thus, although better monitoring is
beneficial independent of the magnitude of payoff externalities, our results suggest that with
the correct intervention in the payoff environment, one can dispense with improvements in
the monitoring technology.
Finally, our paper suggests a plausible explanation for the failure of third-party subsidies
to foster the diffusion of agricultural innovations in developing countries (see Carter, Laajaj
and Yang, 2013, for a discussion of low and heterogeneous adoption rates). In particular, we
highlight an important difference between externally funded subsidies and budget-balanced
(formal or relational) risk-sharing agreements. To understand this difference, contrast the
role of risk sharing with a subsidy for experimentation that reduces γ (for example, through
an increase in the opportunity cost of playing safe or through an external insurance policy
that reduces g).
This effect is best observed when we introduce background learning,27 but also applies








t ) < 0, given ū > I, see ft. 12.
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qualitatively in the baseline model. An important property of background learning is that
the magnitude of the lump-sum losses affects only the timing of experimentation: as the
relative cost of a breakdown γ increases, the thresholds (τ , τ̄), with τ > 0, shift forward.
In other words, a higher γ delays the beginning of experimentation and the beginning of
full experimentation by an equal amount without affecting the equilibrium distribution of
stopping times. Consequently, provided that p0 > pFB, there is no subsidy that yields the
first-best cutoff as an equilibrium policy.
Figure 7 shows the effect of doubling the risk-sharing rate α or halving the risk factor γ.
(a) γ = 1.5
F (t)
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(b) α = 0
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Figure 7: Risk sharing vs. subsidies for (ū, I, µ, p0) = (2.2, 2, 0.25, 0.88).
7 Conclusions
Our results require a number of assumptions. Here, we briefly discuss how we expect them
to extend in two important dimensions.
Inconclusive bad news. A complete analysis under a scenario of inconclusive bad news
(that is, when a breakdown does not reveal the state) seems out of reach. However, we believe
that the belief-disagreement result would become more pronounced. First, if all agents stop
experimenting upon observing a breakdown, then learning stops and beliefs freeze at different
levels depending on the agents’ prior actions. Such endogenous belief heterogeneity has an
effect on policy effectiveness, e.g., if an external agent (the government) were to attempt
to subsidize the risky arm to resume experimentation. Second, behaviour after the first
breakdown can potentially differ across players. In particular, some players may revert to
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the risky arm for some time, whereas others may not. Conditional on the true state, this
exacerbates performance differences, as the agents who were experimenting earlier are those
who continue to do so.
Monitoring and payoff externalities in games of strategic experimentation. De-
spite the stylized nature of the learning processes involved, several economically relevant
implications may be drawn by contrasting the good-news and bad-news models of strategic
experimentation.
We have already remarked on the different welfare implications of observable actions in
the two models. Observability improves welfare under bad news, whereas it is detrimental
under good news. This contrast is easy to understand. Pulling the safe arm slows learning
in both models. However, slowed learning results in more experimentation by others with
good news, whereas it results in less experimentation with bad news.
However, unobservable actions have similar strategic effects under both signal structures.
In the absence of payoff externalities, unobservable actions imply that every best reply
involves frontloading risky (safe) actions in models with good (bad) news.28 In other words,
the pure interior action paths described by Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), Keller and Rady
(2015), and Bonatti and Hörner (2011) rely on either observable actions (the former two) or
payoff externalities (the latter).
This result has differing implications for outcomes and provides a clear, if stylized, crite-
rion to guide policy interventions depending on the nature of the technology. In particular,
in the good-news case, unobservable actions eliminate inefficient delay but preserve the sub-
optimal amount of experimentation. Thus, subsidies can be used to augment the amount
of experimentation. Under bad-news learning, we highlighted three sources of inefficiency:
players experiment too little, with excessive dispersion in both practices and beliefs. Fur-
thermore, in the presence of background learning (see Figure 7), subsidies are able to address
the first source only, and group insurance may be more appropriate.
28For the good-news case, this result can be obtained by modifying Theorem 1 in Bonatti and Hörner
(2011) to account for pure informational externalities. Instead, the welfare comparison above does not rely
on the payoff externality.
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Appendix
A Reformulation of the Objective
Here we reformulate each player’s objective, and we keep track of additional cost terms that






















t ), p0 = p
0.
Let us do the transformations one by one, first rewriting the objective in terms of the log-





reℓtg(1− uit) + ru
i
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Next, we make the change of variable t 7→ t/λ, and we define γ := (g − s)/s and µ := r/λ.
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Integrating the first two terms by parts, and factoring out s, we obtain the following expres-
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B Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of this lemma relies on the proof of Lemma 2, proved next
and independently (except for the last sentence of that next proof, which is not used here).
We apply the maximum principle to P. It is easy to see that the program P is not
abnormal (see Seierstad and Sydsæter 1987, Ch.2.4, Note 5).29 The maximum principle
implies that there exists an absolutely continuous ψ : R+ → R such that (i) ψt > 0 ⇒ u
i
t = 0,
(ii) ψt < 0 ⇒ u
i
t = 1, and (iii) almost everywhere
ψ̇te
µt = γ(I − ν−it − 1 + µ)e
ℓt − µ.





Using the definition of ℓ∗, this is equivalent to
(µ+ I)µ ≥ µ(µ+ I − 1),
which is true.
It follows that ψ is strictly increasing at all times t such that ℓt ∈ [ℓ
∗, ℓ0]; hence, given
(i), there exists t̄ ≥ 0 such that any solution must specify uit = 1 for all t < t̄ and u
i
t = 0 for
t ≥ t̄ (recall that uit = 0 when ℓt < ℓ
∗).







µ(ℓ+ χs) + γ(ν
−i




where we define χs :=
∫ s
τ=t
(ν−iτ − I)dτ as the value from setting u
i = 0 (identically), given ℓ
and t. Note that, integrating by parts,




















29The argument given Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987) must be slightly modified, as it applies to a fixed
horizon. The adjustment is straightforward.
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which is positive if and only if ℓ < ℓ∗. Hence, independently of ν−i, C(ℓ, t) is strictly











t − I) + e
−µt
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µℓt − γ(I − ν
−i





so that setting uit = 0 is optimal. Because of the “if and only if” above, if ν
−i
s = 0 for all
s ≥ t (for which it suffices that ν−it = 0), yet ℓt = ℓ > ℓ
∗, it cannot be that uis = 0 for all
s ≥ t (and so it must be that uit > 0).
Proof of Lemma 3. Ignoring some irrelevant constants, the cost can be rewritten as
















If ν−it = I − 1 and t ∈ suppF
i, yet ℓit < ℓ








t − (µ+ 1) < 0,
by definition of ℓ∗∗. It follows that for small enough ε > 0, Cit−ε < C
i
t , a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4. See Keller and Rady (2015, Proposition 1) for the cooperative solution
uFB. Note that if ℓ > ℓFB, uFB(ℓ) ≤ u′(ℓ) ≤ u′′(ℓ) implies that uFB(ℓ) = u′(ℓ) = u′′(ℓ) = I
and costs are the same under all three policies. Hence, without loss, we assume ℓ0 < ℓFB.
Given some measurable U, Ū : (−∞, ℓ0] → [0, I), with 0 ≤ U(ℓ) < Ū(ℓ) and Ū bounded










over all π : R+ → [0, I], measurable, subject to
ℓ̇t = ut − I, ℓ0 = ℓ
0,
with, for all t ≥ 0 and ℓt ≤ ℓ
0, ut ∈ [U(ℓt), Ū(ℓt)]. By standard arguments, the optimal u is










over all measurable u : (−∞, ℓ0] → [0, I] such that u(ℓ) ∈ [U(ℓ), Ū(ℓ)], where t(ℓ) solves
t(ℓ0) = 0 and
t′(ℓ) = (u(ℓ)− I)−1,
which is well defined because u(ℓ) < Ū(ℓ) < I. A routine application of the maximum
principle (Theorem 4.2, Cesari, 1983) yields that the optimal policy solves u(ℓ) = U(ℓ) a.e.
Given u′, u′′ as stated in the lemma, the result follows if u′′ < I by setting U = u′, Ū = u′′
and noting that u′′ does not satisfy the necessary conditions. The same argument applies
with trivial modifications if Ū = I.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose that players j 6= i stop at some fixed time T ∈ R+. For
clarity, we use I rather 2 for the number of players, as the arguments do not depend on it
(though the statement of Lemma 5 is specialized to that case). Throughout, we assume that
ℓ0 ∈ [ℓ∗, ℓ∗∗], as the result is trivial otherwise. Then, inserting into the objective of player i,


















This gives two expressions for the cost depending on τ ≷ T . Let us write C1 for the cost
when τ ≤ T , and C2 for τ ≥ T (the costs coincide when τ = T ). It is useful to use x = λτ

























eIy+x − (I + µ)ex(I+µ)+y
)
− (I + µ)eIx+y
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It is readily checked that C1 is concave, and so minimized either at x = 0 or x = y, while C2
is convex, and minimized at




Hence, we have only two candidates as global minimizer of the total cost, namely 0 and x∗.
Note that (as shown in Figure 2) the candidate minimizer x∗ (resp., τ) is affine in y (resp.,
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as ℓ0 < ℓ∗∗. Second, ∆(0), viewed as a function of eℓ
0
, is concave, zero at ℓ∗, with zero
derivative at ℓ∗. Hence, ∆(0) ≤ 0 for all ℓ0 ∈ [ℓ∗, ℓ∗∗] (the inequality being strict for ℓ0 > ℓ0).
Finally, with the change of variable Y = e−(1+µ)y , we get that ∆ is convex in Y , and hence
admits at most one root Y , hence y.
Proof of Lemma 6. If any player j uses a pure policy in equilibrium, it must be tj = t̂
so that, by the best-reply analysis in Lemma 5, player i is indifferent between ti = 0 and
ti = t̂+ T , where T := (ℓ0 − ℓ∗).
Lemma 5 further establishes that the best reply to ti = t̂+ T is tj = 0 and that the best
reply to ti = 0 is tj = T . We shall show that T < t̂, so that tj = t̂ cannot be a best reply to
any randomization over ti ∈ {0, t̂+ T}.
It suffices to establish that the best reply to t = T is, in fact, τ = 2T . To do so,

















We want to show this expression is negative, so that switching to the risky arm later than
t = 0 yields strict cost savings (hence that the best reply must be 2T ). Consider the








This expression is strictly decreasing in ℓ0 and negative (it is equal to −µ(1 + µ)) when
evaluated at ℓ0 = ℓ∗. Therefore ∂2Ci/∂ti∂ℓ0 < 0 for all ℓ0. To sign the marginal cost ∂Ci/∂ti
evaluated at ti = 0, it is sufficient to show that it is non-positive when ℓ0 = ℓ∗. This is
indeed the case, as the expression in (14) can be easily verified to be nil for ℓ0 = ℓ∗.
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C Proofs for Section 5
Proof of Theorem 1. We first argue that in every symmetric equilibrium the support of
the distribution is an interval: for all i, suppF i = [τ , τ̄ ], for some τ ≤ τ̄ , with ℓτ̄ = ℓ
∗.
Using the same notation as in the proof of Lemma 2, let χt =
∫ t
τ=0
(ν−iτ − I)dτ . By












which is differentiable in t. If t ∈ suppF i, it must be that the derivative with respect to t








eℓ+χs−µs+tds = 0. (16)
Furthermore, this expression being itself differentiable in t, the second derivative must be
non-negative, which is equivalent to (differentiating and using the first-order condition)
γ(I − 1− ν−it + µ)− (1 + µ)e
−ℓt ≥ 0. (17)
Note that the left-hand side of (17) is decreasing in t if t /∈ ∪j 6=i suppF
j. Hence, if t1, t2 ∈
suppF i, with t1 < t2, it must be that (t1, t2)∩ suppF
j 6= ∅ for at least one j 6= i. Otherwise,
(15) must admit a local maximum at some t ∈ (t1, t2), at which value the inequality of (17) is
reversed. This is inconsistent with the monotonicity of the left-hand side of (17) over (t1, t2),
and the fact that it is positive as either t ↓ t1 or t ↑ t2. Because we focus on symmetric
equilibria, this implies that, for any t1, t2 ∈ suppF
i, t1 < t2, there exists t ∈ (t1, t2) such
that t ∈ suppF i. Hence, the support of F i (a closed set by definition) must be an interval,
and by Lemma 2, we must have ℓτ̄ = ℓ
∗.
Because no pure-policy equilibrium exists, we know τ̄ > τ . Assume for the time being
that τ = 0 (we show later that τ > 0 cannot occur). Because the cost from stopping must be
constant over [0, τ̄ ], the second derivative given by (17) must be identically zero over (0, τ̄).
Inequality (17) immediately gives ν−it as a function of ℓt. Because ℓ is differentiable, so must
ν−i be. Hence, defining ξ−it = (I − 1 − ν
−i
t )/µ and differentiating (17) (eliminating e
ℓt by
using (17)) gives that ξ−i obeys the differential equation
ξ̇−it = µξ
−i
t (1 + ξ
−i
t ),
and so ξ−it = (A1e
−µt − 1)−1 for some A1 > 0 (because ξ
−i
t > 0), yielding
























for some A2 ∈ R. That is,
∫ t
s=0
esdF (s) + (1− F (t))et = eA2e
1
I−1(ln(A1−eµt)+(I−1)t)




Differentiating both sides gives finally













It remains to determine the constants A1, A2.










Moreover, note from (5) that 1− F (0) = ν−i0 /(I − 1). Plugging in (19) for t = 0 using (18)
gives A2 = (A1 − 1)
− 1












(I − 1)(A1e−µt − 1)
)
. (20)
Let us make a few final remarks. First, note that this density is 0 at ℓ0 = ℓ∗∗. That is, if
the game starts with this belief, it never changes and the safe arm is pulled throughout. We
must now rule out that τ > 0 for this special case. If ℓ0 = ℓ∗∗, there is nothing to show (as
the safe arm is pulled forever anyhow). If ℓ0 > ℓ∗∗, the safe arm must be pulled throughout
(the support of the distribution of stopping beliefs must be convex, yet the cost is strictly
quasi-convex in t for ℓ0 > ℓ∗∗, yielding a contradiction if this region included a stopping
time). Now suppose ℓ0 < ℓ∗∗ and τ > 0. Given Lemma 1, the only potentially profitable
deviations are stopping policies πiτ with τ < τ . Note that, given that players j 6= i use the
stopping policy F j, it holds that ν−it = I − 1 for all t < τ . Hence, a necessary condition for
player i to follow the equilibrium policy is that his cost be convex at t = τ . Note that the
value of (17) at t = τ is
γ(I − 1 + µ− ν−iτ )− (1 + µ)e
−ℓτ = γµ− (1 + µ)e−ℓ
0
, (21)
which, using the definition of ℓ∗∗, is negative. Because player i’s cost is constant over (τ , τ̄),
we conclude that deviating to pulling the risky arm at time τ − ε would be a profitable
deviation for ε > 0 small enough.
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Proof of Theorem 2. As mentioned, the proof of this theorem is rather tedious, and
the interested reader might want to consult both the supplementary materials file and a
Mathematica file with some of the omitted algebraic operations, available on the authors’
websites (entitled supplementary.pdf and theorem2proof.nb).
The logic of the argument is as follows. Suppose another equilibrium exists. Because
on any interval over which a player’s opponent does not switch with positive probability,
a player’s cost is convex, there is at most one time during such an interval at which he is
willing to switch. Because of Lemma 6, we know that each player’s equilibrium policy must
include in its support at least two switching times. If the support of a player’s policy is
a dense subset of some interval, then so must be his opponent’s (because of convexity, as
explained), and continuity of the cost function then implies that this support is precisely
[0, τ̄ ], as defined in Theorem 1, and the equilibrium is the one described there. Hence, we
might assume that there exists at least two times t1, t3, with 0 < t1 < t3, such that, say,
player 1’s policy assigns positive probability of switching at times t1 and t3, and at no time
in between. This however implies (convexity again) that there is some time t2 ∈ (t1, t3)
and some time t0 < t1 such that player 2 is willing to switch at time t0 and t2, but at no
time in between (and 1 does not switch at any time in (t0, t1) either).
30 We then derive
a contradiction, showing that independently of how players behave at times not in [t0, t4],
the necessary (first- and second-order) conditions cannot hold simultaneously at those four
dates. See supplementary.pdf for the details.
Proof of Proposition 1. (1.) The stopping-time distribution F It is given by































hence it is smaller than one and increasing in I. Therefore, the partial derivative of F It with
respect to I is positive for all t < τ̄ . In addition, 1− F I0 = ν0/(I − 1) which is increasing in
I. Therefore the distributions F It are ranked by first-order dominance.







µ+ eµt (µ (γeℓ0 − 1)− 1) + 1
)
+ I.
30More precisely, either there is such a t0 < t1, or a t4 > t3 in the support of 2’s policy, but relabeling the
players if necessary, we may as well assume it is t0 < t1.
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Notice that the first term is negative (as νIt ≤ 1). This implies ν
I
t is increasing in I.
(3.) The speed of learning of the outside observer is
−ℓ̇It = I − ν
I
t ,
which is decreasing by inspection of νIt . Therefore, during the mixing phase, beliefs decrease
faster with a lower number of players. Furthermore, as I increases, the length of the mixing
phase increases. However, for t > τ̄ , beliefs decrease at rate I, which implies faster learning
for a higher number of players. Therefore, the outside observer’s belief trajectories for I ′ > I
cross once at a time t > τ̄I′.
(4.) Straightforward computations of the total cost yield expression (9) in the text. This
cost is constant for any I ≥ 2 and (because of positive informational externalities) strictly
lower than the single-agent cost.
D Proofs for Section 6
Proof of Proposition 2. The second inequality of the proposition (νo(p) ≥ νfb(p)) being
immediate given that p̄ < pFB, it is the first inequality that must be established. Given ℓ0
and ℓ < ℓ0, we let t(ℓ) denote the time at which the belief of the outside observer reaches
belief ℓ. Let νit denote the hazard rate of the outsider’s belief at time t, i.e., his belief satisfies
ℓ̇t = −I(1− ν
i
t), ℓ0 = ℓ
0.
Now suppose towards a contradiction that there exists a “belief” ℓ̂ such that the outside
observer’s hazard rate in the unobservable case νn(ℓ̂) is equal to the hazard rate in the
observable case νo(ℓ̂). We derive an ordinary differential equation for ν−i(ℓ) := (I − 1)νit(ℓ)
in both cases.
In the unobservable case, we know from the proof of Theorem 1 that




















(eµt (µ (γeℓ0 − 1)− 1) + µ+ 1)
2 .
Solving for eµt from the definition of ν−it and plugging back into the derivative, we obtain
dν−i(ℓ)
dℓ









Finally, we obtain the derivative
dν−i(ℓ)
dℓ
= (µ+ I − ν−i(ℓ)− 1)
I − ν−i(ℓ)− 1




Note that ν−i(ℓ) is increasing in ℓ, as expected. Also notice that the second term in (22) is
smaller than one, because ν−i ≤ I − 1.
In the observable case, we already have the expression for the hazard rate
ν−i(ℓ) = µ+ I − 1−
1 + (ℓ− ℓ∗)µ
eℓγ − 1
.
Differentiating with respect to ℓ and replacing eℓ with the solution to the previous equation,
we obtain the following differential equation
dν−i(ℓ)
dℓ
= (µ+ I − ν−i(ℓ)− 1)
I − ν−i(ℓ) + µ(ℓ− ℓ∗)
1 + µ(ℓ− ℓ∗)
. (23)
Notice that I − ν−i > 1, and therefore the ratio in (23) is larger than one. Furthermore,
the first term (µ + I − ν−i − 1) is identical in the two expressions (22) and (23). Thus,
if the two paths νo(ℓ) and νn(ℓ) cross, the observable path must be steeper. This yields a
contradiction, because
νo(ℓ∗∗) < νn(ℓ∗∗) = I − 1,
and therefore if the paths ν(ℓ) cross, the unobservable path must be steeper at the crossing
point closest to ℓ∗∗.




































+ µsℓt − e
ℓt(g(1− α)− s)(I − ν−it − 1 + µ)
)
dt. (24)
Substituting a stopping policy πt for player i, differentiating twice with respect to t, and
setting the first derivative equal to zero yields
γ
(
I + µ− ν−it − 1
)












which is the analogue of expression (17).
The construction of the equilibrium distribution then mirrors the proof of Theorem 1.
In particular, let ξ := (I − ν−it − 1)/µ, and differentiate with respect to time to obtain the
differential equation
ξ̇ = µξ(1 + ξ) + ξB,
where
B :=
α(1 + γ)(I + µ− I)
γ(I − 1)− α(1 + γ)I
.
































A1(1 +B/µ)e−(B+µ)t − 1
)
,
which reduces to our baseline Ft if α and hence B are equal to zero. To solve for A1, A2 we
then combine (25) (equal to zero) and (26), with ℓt = ℓ
0, to solve for ν−i0 . Finally, we impose
F0 = 1− ν
−i
0 /(I − 1).
(2.) Let players −i follow the threshold policy p∗α. It follows from Lemma 2 that player i
wishes to begin experimentation immediately whenever p0 < p∗α (and hence players −i pull
the risky arm). When p0 ≥ p∗α, players −i never experiment. We know from Lemma 3 that





hence player i is not willing to experiment.
Proof of Proposition 3. Note that the social planner’s problem is unaffected by the







We can then solve for the value of α that equates the two beliefs pFB and p∗α, obtaining the
expression for α∗ in equation (10). It is then immediate to verify that
α∗ =
γ(I − 1)
(1 + γ)(I + µ)
<




Proof of Theorem 5. Let γ̃ := (g(1 − α) − s)/s, and write the expression for expected


















This corresponds to the objective in Keller and Rady (2015), up to an additional term
(the validity of this approach can be validated by a verification theorem, the HJB equation

















Therefore, during the interior-action phase, we have
µℓ∗α − µ− I = µℓ− (I − 1)u







Solving for ui(ℓ), and setting equal to one, we obtain the following equation for the threshold
ℓ̄α:
µℓ∗α − µ− I = µℓ− (I − 1)− γ̃µe
ℓ,
yielding the expression in the text. Further, it is easy to verify that α∗ and ℓ∗ solve the
above equation, i.e., the two thresholds ℓ∗ and ℓ̄ coincide.
What happens for α > α∗? Consider a player’s expected cost when all other players












Now compute the belief such that ∂Co/∂ℓ = 0 from the HJB equation (27) when all players
are playing safe and the continuation payoff is given by C(ℓ) in (28). This belief ℓBα satisfies
µC(ℓ) = µℓ− (I − 1)− γ̃µeℓ,







Therefore, for α > α∗ there is a single switching belief p∗. At the first-best belief, play-
ers are indifferent given that all others play safe. At the threshold p∗α, they are indifferent
given that all others play risky. Thus, any symmetric equilibrium with observable actions
involves strictly less experimentation than the unique equilibrium under non-observable ac-
tions (which involves pure policies with threshold p∗α) but nevertheless a (weakly) excessive
amount of experimentation from the planner’s perspective.
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